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On Understanding the Supreme Court. By Paul A. Freund. Boston: Little,
Brown & Co., 195o. Pp. xvi, 128. $3.50.
It took a political, economic and jurisprudential upheaval, revolutionary in
its ultimate effect if not in its immediate method, to confirm for American con-
stitutional law, the observation of Justice Holmes that the "life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience." Sociological jurisprudence has carried
the field before it; its devotees populate the judiciary, the bar, and the rostrum.
Most all of them agree that the "felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral
and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal
more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed."' The syllogism is dead: Long live sociological constitutional law!
Yet, as the cheering subsides and we revert to the business of studying, ap-
praising, and prophesying the course of American constitutional law, the task
may be no easier under the rule of the sociologist than it was under that of the
logician. Both have their complexities. It is to furnish an understanding of the
range and scope of these problems as they beset the United States Supreme
Court that Professor Freund has presented us with the published edition of
three stimulating lectures which he delivered under the auspices of the Julius
Rosenthal Foundation of the Northwestern University School of Law, in April
1949.
Few are the eccentrics who cling to the Blackstonian myth that "judges do
not create, but merely find the law." The myth is exposed, but the true facts, as
is so often the case, are tougher to understand than the fairy tale which they
displaced. How does the Court make law? Why? In what frame of reference?
When? It is to this type of inquiry that Professor Freund's book is addressed.
No pretense is made of detailed study of the Court's philosophy, personnel, or
method. The three essays contained therein have been selected for the prime
purpose of introducing to us the difficult problem of the One and the Many in
our judicial system, i.e. one Supreme Court and many states, many courts, and
many organs of government, with this one Supreme Court "speaking with
many, often discontentingly many, voices."
The first essay, entitled "Concord and Discord," is perhaps the best from the
point of view of executing the purpose of the book. The main theme of this
I Holmes, The Common Law i (i88i). For a recent interesting discussion of the American
jurisprudential transition from mechanistic to sociological, see Commager, The American
Mind 359-90 (ig5o).
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essay is the attitude of the Court toward that somewhat loosely delimited field
called "civil liberties." To that fundamental theme we have a Court which
pays homage far beyond that ever given, even by Courts who numbered Holmes,
Brandeis, Hughes, and Cardozo in their ranks. However, Professor Freund
carefully and objectively unfolds the cross-currents of discord that mar the
harmony of the main theme. Truly the light of liberalism sends its shafts in
many directions. While all the present members of the Court could be put down
as men who value human rights or personal liberty above the right of property,
with reference to the permissible impact of the regulatory powers of the state,2
the problem is not that simple. The choice in a particular case is never presented
in such an "either-or" frame of reference. The choice is rarely between black
and white but more usually hidden in a vast spectrum of values and policy
decisions. Civil liberties are to be preserved, yes, but their preservation in a
particular case may necessitate examination of the nature of our federalism,
the due accommodation of state legislative policies, the observation of pro-
cedural regularity, and other judicial tasks equally complex to resolve.
Thus, we see a Court which wrestles with the problem of reconciling the ag-
gressive liberties of speech, publication, and practice of religion with the pas-
sive liberties-the rights of privacy and private belief. On the whole, the Court
has been more accommodating to the aggressive liberties, with the Jehovah's
Witnesses cases,3 Terminiello v. Chicago,4 and Saia v. New York s illustrating the
degree thereof. On the other hand, the right of privacy in the sense of protection
from unreasonable search and seizure has been supported only in wavering
fashion by the Court. It is interesting to note how one of the most vigorous sup-
porters of free speech, justice Black, is only lukewarm in his defense of personal
immunity against search and seizure, while Justice Frankfurter evens up the
score in a vice-versa switch.6 Clearly the Court protects civil liberties, but which
one in any given case is something else again.
The second theme of discord developed by Professor Freund is the dis-
2 While their number has shrunk, their voices are yet heard. See, e.g., Barrett, review of
Frank, Courts on Trial, i9 Fordham L. Rev. 117, 1i8 (1950). However, adult realization that
the Supreme Court perforce must affect policy and make law in the positive law sense does
not conflict with the Thomistic theory of natural law, viz., that there are immutable principles
of justice binding everywhere on all men. It is when the Thomistic philosophical natural law
theory is perverted to serve materialistic laissez faire ends that an apparent clash arises between
defenders of the present Supreme Court and the proponents of Herbert Spencer revisited.
3 Consult Scanlan, The Passing of Mr. Justice Murphy-The Conscience of a Court, 25
Notre Dame Lawyer 7, 14-18 (1949).
4 337 U.S. 1 (i949). s 3 3 4 U.S. 558 (1948).
6 This reviewer has his own beliefs as to why this occurs. Justice Black, former police court
judge and the grand inquisitor of the Black Senate investigating committee, has an under-
standable sympathy, born of practical experience, with the difficulties of official attempts to
procure the information necessary to govern, judge, or arrest. Justice Frankfurter, the active
academician of Sacco and Vanzetti memory, does not, but on the contrary undoubtedly
carries a psychological, as well as a philosophical, bias toward any laxity of procedural safe-
guards in the field of criminal law.
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harmony which exists among the members of the Court concerning the correct
application of the famous "clear and present danger" test inherited from Jus-
tice Holmes as the constitutional formula for determining where the right of
free speech ends and permissible legislative restriction of it begins. Like all legal
formulas and rules, the "clear and present danger" formula means different
things to different men. And so it is with the present Supreme Court. As Pro-
fessor Freund points out, it is no surprise that those judges who are partial to
the "aggressive liberties" are also quite willing to apply the "clear and present
danger" rule in areas where its application is not too readily apparent, such as
in determining the permissible scope of the judicial contempt power, or the
allowable area of political activity on the part of government employees. Con-
trariwise, the judicial defenders of the "passive" virtues, protest against the
use here of the "clear and present danger" test, and remind us that axiomatic
application of Holmes' felicitous phrase is no substitute for the intelligent value
judgments that must be made from case to case. As the case of the convicted
Communists approaches the Supreme Court, Professor Freund's inquiries here
serve to set the scene for the profound judgment that must soon be made, i.e.,
the judicial demarcation of where provocative, deceitful, but free speech ends,
and seditious conspiracy begins-no easy line-marking job, but one that can
be better performed if judicial over-simplication is avoided by both the deter-
mined protectors of free speech and the equally determined defenders of ortho-
doxy and the Republic.
A final disharmonious note pervades the Court's outward allegiance to civil
liberty. That is found in the conflicting attitudes taken toward the relationship
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights. Does the ideal of federal-
ism and the Supreme Court's deference toward state legislative policies and
criminal procedure explain the present personalized "natural law" approach of
a majority of the Court? Does the Fourteenth Amendment embrace only the
"fundamental principles of justice" as each individual judge sees them, or is
Justice Black closer to a rule which promotes certainty along with fairness when
he argues that the original congressional intention behind the Fourteenth
Amendment was the incorporation of the Bill of Rights? Professor Freund
brings these interrogatories to the reader in an illuminating manner, although
the reviewer wishes he had made reference to still another view of the matter.
The late Justice Murphy and the late Justice Rutledge advanced a third view,
namely, the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights, but it
doesn't stop there; we have learned a few things since 1791.7 In dosing his dis-
7 Interestingly enough, each of the three theories rests on a natural law basis-the ma-
jority's theory, avowedly so. And since the Bill of Rights has its philosophical base in natural
law theory, Justice Black's view to that extent has natural law to thank. Also, the advanced
position of Justice Murphy and Justice Rutledge rests on natural law foundations, brought
up to date by taking into consideration the constitutional experiences of i6o years. Those who
claim that the present Supreme Court has abandoned "natural law" theories are either very
much in error, or, as is more likely the case, they are referring to the economic "natural law"
of Darwin, Spencer and Sumner.
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cussion of this phase of his book Professor Freund reminds us that the heat and
acrimony engendered by the disagreements of the Court in the field of civil
liberties are not to be taken as evidence of a Great Divide. The ideal is a unani-
mous one, its application is the source of the friction. But friction is the advo-
cate's meat and Professor Freund has given us some nice chunks to masticate.
His second essay is one on Justice Brandeis. This reviewer believes that it
was given in the hope of exposing the over-simplification of labeling a judge as
a "liberal" or a "conservative" and hoping by that approach to have furnished
an index of his opinions. Brandeis certainly could be referred to as a "liberal'
judge; the little minds who almost blocked his nomination would have been
willing to concede that, and then some. Yet, as Professor Freund points out, if
we stopped there we would certainly be at a loss to explain Brandeis, the stickler
for procedural regularity, the high priest of a harmonious federalism, the joyful
executioner of Swift v. Tyson,g and the proud creator of Brie R. Co. v. Thomp-
kins.9 Nor could it serve to explain his complete support of the Court against a
president's scheme to expand it when it seemed such an obstacle to the demo-
cratic expression of the will of the people. Equally would it be unavailing in
understanding his concept of stare decisis in interpreting statutes, a concept
that he embraced so completely that it probably propelled him to reverse Swift
v..Tyson on constitutional grounds, rather than resting with a decision which
said merely that the Rules of Decision Act had been erroneously interpreted.
The lesson the reader could learn from this second essay is one that should be
very appropriate in these days of political name-calling and muck-raking.
The last essay entitled "Judge and Company" is an abortive effort to set
forth some of the techniques and approaches which might be useful to the con-
stitutional law advocate. This reviewer has no quarrel with this objective, nor
with the essay as far as it goes. However, even granting that the book is pur-
posely limited in the subject matter attempted, it does appear that this essay
adds little to the previous two. Moreover, the recent appearance of two other
complete works touching on appellate advocacy before the high court 0 per-
haps make this last essay seem more trite than otherwise might be the case.
There are two points touched upon in the last essay which bear repetition,
however. Professor Freund calls attention to the lack of, and the inaccessibility
of adequate legislative histories of state legislation. State legislative history
materials have too long been in a disorganized and unsatisfactory state. Im-
provement in this field is more than ever demanded, especially when we con-
sider Professor Freund's concluding observation. With the increasing reluctance
of the Supreme Court to declare legislation unconstitutional under the due
process clause unless basic civil liberties are involved, the result may be a cor-
8 41 U.S. r, 16 Pet. (U.S.) 1 (1842).
9304 U.S. 64 (r938).
xoWeiner, Effective Appellate Advocacy (195o); Gressman and Stem, Supreme Court
Practice (1950).
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responding increase in the substantive due process on the state level. A recent
article has recalled our attention to this area.Y This reviewer realizes that our
constitutional history has demonstrated that, strangely enough, Hamiltonian-
ism and John Marshallism have served liberalism well; and that paradoxically,
too, Jefferson's "states rights" theory has been perverted to the service of
money changers. He hopes, however, that state "substantive due process" will
not provide the refuge afforded by the pre-Roosevelt Court for economic laissez
faire masquerading in the disarming robes of "natural law" (Darwinian style).
Professor Freund has presented us with a well-written stimulating, and objec-
tive work. What it lacks in integration of subject matter, it more than makes up
in reader interest and appeal. I dare say neither the partisans of the Right nor
the Left will particularly appreciate his effort. The Right will writhe at the
cavalier way in which he relegates the gilded age of judicial hyper-protection
of "property rights" to the discard heap. The Left will be equally uncomfort-
able with his picture of a Supreme Court to whom "civil liberty" doesn't
always mean "civil license." Those, however, who wish to understand more in-
teligently the "cult of the robe" (as Judge Jerome Frank has called it), and
who prefer to have knowledge of the workings of a judiciary in a democracy
rather than merely to give emotional obeisance thereto, will enjoy this book,
and perhaps be enlightened. A recent writer has suggested that "the nature of
the American government depends upon the opinion and the principles of the
men who constitute the Supreme Court.... Since they are men, not gods, they
are presumably subject to mundane influence, and a study of American govern-
ment must therefore include a study of the tastes and temptations of judges."12
This still may come as a shock to some. Whatever the virtue of "shock treat-
ment," Professor Freund's work is an excellent initial dose for those who wish
eventually to attain mature understanding of American constitutional law in
action.
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War and Civilization. By Arnold J. Toynbee, selected by Albert V. Fowler
London: Oxford University Press, 1950. Pp. xiv, 165. $2.50.
A Plan for Peace. By Grenville Clark. New York: Harper & Bros., 1950. Pp. xii,
83. $1.00.
In a preface to Mr. Fowler's selections, Professor Toynbee expresses the
opinion that war explains the breakdowns of civilizations. To one reader of the
volumes of Mr. Toynbee's Study of History, from which the selections are made,
the observation causes difficulty.
-: Paulsen, "Natural Rights"--A Constitutional Doctrine in Indiana, 25 Ind. L.J. 123
(rgo).
12 Agar, The Price of Union i94 (I950).
* Legislative Attorney, Office of Counsel, Secretary of Defense.
